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Highlights
• The cost of gas transmission networks in Europe is currently covered 
via the so-called entry-exit tariffs. This tariff methodology is based on 
charging capacity reservations at both entry and exit points of balanc-
ing zones, or entry-exit systems. Current entry-exit systems largely 
coincide with Member States’ territory. 
• The entry-exit model has supported a smooth transition from the 
traditional organisation of the European gas industry to a single liber-
alised European market. However, as the EU gas market develops, the 
current tariff methodology is now being questioned, on the grounds 
that it may be unsuitable to achieve the objective of a single pan-Euro-
pean market, with unbiased gas flows and no obstacles to trading. 
• This Policy Brief presents an alternative approach to gas transmission 
cost recovery that would address most of the drawbacks of the current 
methodology. The qualifying feature of our proposal is that the entire 
transmission revenue requirement is met by charging the transmis-
sion network’s exit points to distribution networks and to directly 
connected end-customers. 
• In contrast to the current system, our model requires an explicit 
mechanism to share the cost of transit networks among consumers 
connected in different countries. We consider two possible designs for 
such mechanisms. The first one assesses the share of transit networks’ 
cost falling on destination countries according to a methodology that 
mimics current arrangements. This model could be implemented with 
no or limited impact on the institutional framework currently govern-
ing the European gas transmission sector.  
• The second design option allocates ex-ante a share of the overall 
revenue requirement to each European country. In this approach, the 
share of transit networks cost falling on destination countries does not 
depend on the tariffs and realised demand for that networks’ services. 
This approach would address potential weaknesses of the current 
regulatory framework in case the trend of declining gas demand does 
not reverse, and/or if covering most of the cost of (desirable) network 
upgrades cannot be met by selling long-term transmission rights. 
• Although our proposal is conceived with reference to the entire 
Union, our approach might entail the first phase of implementation 
at regional scale.
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1. The Current Gas Transmission Tariff 
Methodology in Europe
The main features of the current European gas trans-
mission tariff methodology include:
• Network users pay for the right to move gas 
across the borders of neighbouring gas systems 
(or entry-exit zones). The tariff is assessed based 
on the transmission capacity reservations and, in 
some systems, on the gas volumes moved across 
the interconnection.
• The entry-exit zones largely reflect the political 
geography of Europe, thus applying at the borders 
of its Member States. 
• The tariff level for each entry or exit point is set 
by the national regulator of the country in which 
the point is located, according to a methodology 
that splits the total cost of the zone’s transmission 
network among all entry and exit points. 
Resulting Distortions in Gas Market Results
Under the current tariff system, the cost of trans-
porting gas to a particular country may vary 
depending on the path leading to its final destina-
tion, and thus the different entry-exit zones which 
need to be crossed. 
As a consequence:
• the merit order of natural gas sources for the 
country may be distorted, resulting in imports 
from systems where gas is more expensive. 
• as the existing entry-exit zones coincide with the 
political borders of Member States, tariff pan-
caking results when gas is carried through multiple 
entry-exit zones. The resulting path-dependency 
of transmission costs inefficiently discourages gas 
flows within Europe, since tariffs do not reflect the 
avoidable cost of using the infrastructure.
1.  More precisely, the tariff components that are not commodity-based.
• for the same reason, the current transmission tariff 
methodology inefficiently reduces cross-border 
provision of flexibility services. In particular, 
transmission fees make the cost of balancing a 
position in a country with domestic storage or 
with storage located in a neighbouring country 
largely different. Such cost gap does not reflect, as 
it should, different variable cost of moving gas to 
and from the different storage sites. This holds all 
the more because of the inter-temporal structure 
of current transmission tariffs that in most coun-
tries penalise short-term purchases of transmis-
sion services.
Note that transmission tariffs1 are sunk cost to long-
term capacity holders since these tariffs are due 
whether or not capacity is used; as a consequence, 
for long-term capacity holders, the decision to use 
their capacity holdings is not affected by the level of 
transmission tariffs. However, in case the existing 
long-term capacity reservations are not renewed, the 
price elasticity of demand for transmission services 
at each entry/exit point will increase at their expira-
tion, exacerbating the distortive effects of the cur-
rent tariff methodology.
Sustainability of Low-Utilisation Infrastructures 
Contributing to Security of Supply 
Cost recovery of infrastructures with low utilisa-
tion, but contributing to security of supply or con-
testability of the European market, might become 
difficult with the current tariff methodology. For 
example, if utilisation of a large pipeline – mostly 
used for transit – in a small entry-exit system fell, 
the tariff increases, which are necessary to offset the 
missing revenues on transits, may become unsus-
tainable.    
Unwanted Wealth Transfers 
Differentiation of wholesale gas prices at different 
locations may generate unwanted wealth transfers. 
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Consider for example a country in which the mar-
ginal gas – i.e. the gas that sets the wholesale price in 
the country –  is carried through the path with the 
highest total transmission cost. Since the price of the 
marginal gas reflects its transportation cost, all other 
gas imports will enjoy a rent unrelated to cost2.
Uncertainty 
To the extent that the current entry-exit model is a 
source of uncertainty on the value of transmission 
rights, it reinforces the tendency to short-termism in 
gas trading decisions. This is due to regulatory uncer-
tainty on the conditions triggering tariff changes and 
on the content of such changes3. 
Provisions introduced by the recent tariff Network 
code do mitigate some of the drawbacks of the 
current system. However, the structure of the cost 
recovery mechanism, and the corresponding limits, 
remain unchanged. 
2. An Alternative Cost Recovery 
Mechanism for Gas Transmission in 
Europe
In the current system, mostly fixed costs are covered 
through charges on capacity reservations. Economic 
theory4 indicates that covering infrastructure’s fixed 
cost with charges based on the demand for its ser-
vices distorts its use and that the resulting ineffi-
ciency is larger the bigger the price-elasticity of the 
demand is for transmission services. 
Since multiple paths across different entry-exit zones 
to move gas between two systems are available, the 
price elasticity of demand for transmission services 
along each path is well above the elasticity of demand 
2.  Equal to the difference between total transmission charges on the marginal source and their own.
3.  This issue has been recognized by the recent Network code on capacity allocation mechanisms (COMMISSION REGULA-
TION (EU) 2017/459) but only for newly built infrastructures and Network code on tariffs (COMMISSION REGULATION 
(EU) 2017/460).
4.  For example, D. Bös, Pricing and Price Regulation, Volume 34, 1st Edition, An Economic Theory for Public Enterprises and 
Public Utilities, 1994, Elsevier Publisher. 
for gas expressed by final consumers at the destina-
tion. This generally does not hold for the transmis-
sion network’s exit points to distribution networks 
or large end-consumer sites, where price elasticity of 
demand for transmission services reflects the price 
elasticity of the consumers’ demand for gas directly.
For this reason, to minimise distortions, we propose 
to select the less elastic charging basis, namely the 
demand for capacity reservations at the transmis-
sion network’s exit points to distribution networks 
or large end-consumer sites. 
Differently from the current system, our proposal 
suggests that entry into a transmission system and 
exit to an interconnecting system are not charged. As 
a result, in our proposal, the entire transmission cost 
on the European network would then be passed on 
to consumers via the transmission tariff, whereas in 
the current system a material share of transportation 
cost is embedded in wholesale gas prices. 
This implies that transmission tariffs cannot be used 
to share the cost of a transit network among those 
who benefit from it. For this reason, an explicit 
mechanism to split the cost of transmission infra-
structures among the European gas consumers 
would be necessary. We sketch next two extreme 
designs of this cost-sharing mechanism, which we 
intend to analyse further in a forthcoming research 
project.  
Option 1: A Cost-Sharing Mechanism Preserving the 
Core Features of the Current Arrangements 
The core features of the institutional framework 
currently governing the European gas transmission 
sector can be summarized as:
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• National regulators (NRAs) independently 
approve transmission investments in their own 
country and set the corresponding revenue allow-
ance. NRAs set the rate of return that gas trans-
mission investments are allowed to achieve, as 
well as the risk allocation between investors and 
consumers, for example in the context of incen-
tive-based regulatory mechanisms. 
• The majority of network upgrade cost is covered 
by selling long-term commitments to network 
users; the remaining part, expected to be small, is 
shared by the involved regulators on a largely vol-
untary basis.  
• The overall transmission revenue requirement of 
transit countries is shared with consumers con-
nected in the destination countries based on 
transit gas volumes; each regulator’s discretion in 
splitting the cost between domestic consumption 
and transit is limited by the provisions of the Tariff 
network code5. 
Our first option for a cost-sharing mechanism aims 
to preserve those features of the current institutional 
framework. In particular, in the current model, the 
division of the costs generated by transits depends 
on the demand for that network’s services; the split 
is therefore only known after demand is known. On 
the contrary, in our proposed approach, the revenue 
requirement for each system has to be set ex-ante, 
for the national regulator to set transmission tariffs 
consistent with it. Replicating this feature of the cur-
rent mechanism in an exit-only tariff system, like the 
one we propose, entails: 
• an initial forecast of the demand for transit ser-
vices; on that basis the transit network’s revenue 
requirement is provisionally split between the 
5.  COMMISSION REGULATION (EU) 2017/460.
6.  In addition to the domestic revenue requirement.
7.  Including inter-TSO compensation.
transit country’s consumers and the consumers 
connected in destination countries, as it would 
happen in the current system;
• transmission tariffs then can be set, at the exit 
point of the transmission networks to the distri-
bution networks, by each national regulator to 
meet each country’s revenue requirement, which 
includes the allocated share of the transit network 
cost6;
• inter-TSO compensation is set based on actual 
ex-post demand or the transit network’s services, 
to obtain the same outcome as with the current 
methodology;
• in the following year’s tariff-setting round, any 
gaps between TSO’s allowed and actual revenues7, 
due to errors in the initial forecast of demand for 
transit services, are offset.
Option 2: A Cost-Sharing Mechanism Addressing 
also Broader Weaknesses of the Current Framework 
Under the current arrangements to share transmis-
sion cost among European gas consumers: 
• if demand in destination countries – and there-
fore demand for transit capacity – fall, consumers 
in transit countries might end up paying a greater 
share of network cost. This might be challenged 
as unfair, on the basis that network infrastruc-
tures were built based on different assumptions on 
transit and domestic use;  
• if the current reluctance of market participants 
to take long-term transmission related commit-
ments endures, a large share of network upgrade 
cost will have to be allocated directly to the ben-
efitting countries; this might generate pressure for 
a more structured and transparent process for the 
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selection of network upgrades as well as for their 
cost allocation.8
Our second option for a cost-sharing mechanism 
is meant to address these weaknesses of the current 
framework. Although we cast the model’s descrip-
tion with reference to the entire Union, our approach 
lends itself to implementation at a regional scale.
2.1 Identification of the European Transmission 
Network
The first element of the methodology is a network 
of European interest (the ‘European transmission 
network’). Intuitively, we conceive the European 
transmission network as including all assets that 
could have resulted in the planning activity of a pan-
European regulator. A reasonable starting point to 
define the boundaries of the European transmission 
network would be what national regulators cur-
rently regard as transmission assets. Our criterion 
for inclusion would not distinguish among assets 
currently used to transport gas and assets with poor 
load factor but contributing to security of supply and 
contestability of the European market, nor would 
we distinguish between infrastructure with cross-
border relevance and state-specific assets. Finally, 
LNG terminals, as entry points to the European 
market, would be included in the European trans-
mission network9. 
2.2 Revenue Allowance for the European 
Transmission Network
In the second step of the methodology, a revenue 
allowance for each asset included in the European 
8.  One may argue that the market’s reluctance to buy long term may be address by a tariff structure that penalizes short term 
purchase. In fact, this would perpetuate the distortions in capacity utilisation (in the direction of underutilization) that our 
proposed tariff structure the seeks to eliminate. 
9.  Alternative more selective inclusion criteria could be opaque, as for example some assets serve multiple purposes, and un-
stable – as for example the same asset may gain or lose cross-border relevance in time.
10.  A reasonable starting point to set those shares could be the transmission cost currently borne by each country’s customers. 
However, assessing current transmission costs paid by a country’s customers presents its own problems, since part of that 
cost is embedded in wholesale gas prices.
transmission network is computed. Various issues 
would have to be addressed at this stage, in par-
ticular, related to the degree of harmonisation of 
national regulatory schemes. 
Specific provisions, possibly transitory, might have 
to be implemented to address material deviations 
between revenues currently obtained for transmis-
sion owners and their revenue allowance according 
to the harmonised scheme, in particular keeping 
into account changes in the risk-allocation to trans-
mission owners that may result from the move to the 
new scheme. 
2.3 Sharing the Overall Revenue Requirement Among 
Member States
The third element of the methodology consists in 
allocating a share of the overall revenue requirement 
to each European country. In developing this crucial 
part of the mechanism, two opposing views would 
be confronted. The first view emphasises that the 
current stock of infrastructures is the result of inde-
pendent decisions by Member States. In this perspec-
tive, each country should bear the risk that, in time, 
the value of its transmission assets could turn out 
different from what expected when it was decided. 
Consistently with this approach, a fixed part of the 
revenue requirement of the European transmission 
network should be assigned to each Member State, 
and that burden would be largely independent of the 
country’s consumption and procurement sources10. 
The second view would emphasise that national 
regulators and governments have traditionally pur-
sued the objective to deliver uniform service to all 
citizens, to the extent that this was feasible at rea-
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sonable cost. Furthermore, geographical tariff aver-
aging, at the national or regional level, is a feature 
of most national tariff systems. This approach would 
provide grounds for higher degrees of cost averaging 
and risk socialisation among European consumers. 
The best balance between these views is a matter for 
political determination.
2.4 Tariff Setting 
Finally, tariffs in each country would be set to cover 
the country’s share of the total revenue requirement. 
As discussed in in the previous section, in our pro-
posal the entire revenue requirement would be met 
by charges the transmission network’s exit points 
to distribution networks and customer’s premises 
directly connected to the transmission network. 
Compared to the current system, the cost-sharing 
option considered in this section implies a greater 
level of coordination of Member States’ governments 
and regulators. In particular, this option entails an 
explicit agreement on cost-sharing among all con-
cerned Member States. Furthermore, it is likely to 
entail more involvement of NRAs in the EU wide 
investment decision-making process, which deter-
mines the total cost to be shared among countries 
and each country’s benefits quota, in terms of access 
to a diversified portfolio of potential suppliers and 
security of supply, in exchange for the cost that the 
country has paid. 
3. Conclusions
The entry-exit model currently in place has been key 
to the overall positive development of the EU gas 
market in the last years. However, since the release of 
the Third Package (2007), when the entry-exit model 
looked like the most appropriate choice for that 
time’s needs, most of the EU gas market’s fundamen-
tals have changed. It is, therefore, time to look for a 
new model which could effectively address today’s 
challenges (renewable generation, end of long-term 
contracts, etc).
We propose an alternative model based on charging 
only the transmission network’s exit points to distri-
bution networks and to directly connected end-cus-
tomers. We considered two versions of the model: 
the first option focuses on ease of implementation, 
by minimising the impact on the overall framework 
governing gas transmission in Europe. 
The second option addresses broader potential 
weaknesses of the current arrangements, but would 
likely require a new governance structure. Notably, 
it would entail bringing the process of coordination 
of national energy policies to the next level, with 
greater participation of NRAs in the EU-wide invest-
ment decision-making process determining on one 
side the total cost to be shared among countries and, 
on the other, each country’s quota of resulting costs 
and benefits.
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